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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DANNY KRAMER, ) 
Appellant, ) APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
vs. ) 
JAMES FRIEDMAN, ) Case No. 900276 
) Priority Classification 16 
Appellee. ) 
Appellant Danny Kramer ("Kramer") will reply herein to 
certain of the arguments raised by Appellee James Friedman 
("Friedman") in his Brief. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Friedman does not deny that he borrowed money from 
Kramer or that Friedman prevailed upon his friend to 
continually extend additional time for repayment of the loan 
or that Friedman repeatedly promised and assured Kramer that 
Friedman would repay the loan or that in 1987 he executed the 
1987 Note again promising to pay Kramer. Rather, Friedman 
baldly asserts that he cannot be forced to repay his 
obligation because the statute of limitations supposedly 
commenced running back in 1981 in spite of the extensions and 
promises and had expired when the 1987 Note was executed so 
there was supposedly no consideration for that note. Friedman 
further argues that neither the 1987 Note nor his later 
payment operated to revive the 1981 debt because the note did 
not expressly refer to the 1981 Loan and Kramer supposedly did 
not sue on the 1981 Loan. 
Neither the evidence below nor the controlling law 
supports Friedman's tortured arguments. This court can and 
should require Friedman to pay the debt admittedly owed to 
Kramer. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THERE WAS ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION FOR THE 1987 NOTE. 
1. The Statute of Limitations Had Not Run on the 1981 
Loan When the 1987 Note Was Executed. 
In Kramer's Brief, it was demonstrated that the 
undisputed evidence in the district court was that after the 
$5,000.00 loan was made in 1981 (the "1981 Loan11), Friedman 
repeatedly requested and was given extensions of time to repay 
the indebtedness until March, 1987 when Friedman executed a 
$15,000.00 Promissory Note (the "1987 Note"). Thus, the 
statute of limitations had not run at the time the 1987 Note 
was signed and the existence of the 1981 indebtedness served 
as consideration for the 1987 Note. Friedman does not deny in 
his Brief that the extensions were requested and given. 
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Rather, Friedman attempts to avoid the fatal effect of this 
evidence on his statute of limitations claim by now arguing 
for the first time in his Brief that the extensions given by 
Kramer were not valid because Friedman gave no consideration 
for the extensions. This contention is utterly devoid of 
merit for at least three reasons. 
First, this contention was not made in the district 
court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 
667, 672 (Utah 1982). In fact, Friedman didn't even raise 
this contention in his Motion for Summary Disposition before 
this court. In that motion, Friedman only contended that the 
extensions of time for repayment of the 1981 Loan were not 
valid because those extensions were not in writing. Based on 
the authorities Kramer cited in his Brief, Friedman has now 
had to concede that the extensions were not required to be in 
writing [Friedman Brief, p. 12]. Friedman has now changed his 
position in one last attempt to avoid the indisputable fact 
that the statute of limitations on the 1981 Loan had not run 
because continual extensions of time for repayment were given 
by Kramer to Friedman until 1987 when the 1987 Note was 
executed. 
Second, Friedman did in fact give consideration for 
the extensions. He impliedly agreed to continue being 
responsible for accruing interest during the period of the 
extensions. For example, in Strong v. Sunset Copper Co., 114 
3 
P.2d 526, 530 (Wash,, 1941), the court held that a debt was not 
barred by the statute of limitations because of extensions 
given for payment of the debt, quoting with approval from 
Williston as follows: 
"When a debtor and creditor agree that an 
interest-bearing debt shall be extended for a 
fixed time, the promise of each is of 
something detrimental, as the creditor 
promises to forbear the collection of his 
claim, and the debtor gives up his power to 
stop the accrual of further interest by 
payment of the principal at maturity. 
Accordingly, such agreements are generally 
upheld.11 
The debtor's promise to pay interest during the extension 
period is not required to be expressed and may be implied from 
the mere agreement to extend the period of time for payment. 
Hackin v. First National Bank of Arizona, 419 P.2d 529, 531 
(Ariz. 1966); 1 Williston on Contracts, §122. In the present 
case the evidence was that the time for payment was extended 
until March 1987 when the 1987 Note was signed. However, it 
is not necessary that the extension be for specific, fixed 
period of time in order for there to be consideration from the 
debtor. Thus, in Hammel v. Ziegler Financing Corp., 3 34 
N.W.2d 913 (Wis.App. 1983), the court rejected the contention 
that because the extension was not for a fixed period of time 
so that the debt was thereafter payable upon demand, that 
there was no consideration. The court observed: 
A promise to forbear and give further 
time for the payment of a debt, although no 
specific time is named, if followed by actual 
forbearance for a reasonable time, is a valid 
4 
and sufficient consideration for a promise 
guaranteeing its payment. [3 34 N.W.2d at 917] 
Third, Friedman's contention that Kramer cannot rely 
on the extensions because Friedman gave no consideration for 
those extensions is novel to say the least. Friedman 
obviously cites no authority for the astonishing proposition 
that if one party to an agreement gives no consideration, the 
other party to the agreement who gave valid consideration and 
fully performed the agreement cannot rely on the agreement. 
That argument does irreparable injury to basic contract law. 
Thus, in the Restatement of Contracts (Second) §75, Comment d, 
Illustration 4, the following example is given: 
A promises to forbear suit against B in 
exchange for Bfs promise to pay a liquidated 
and undisputed debt to A. Afs promise is not 
binding because B's promise is not 
consideration under Section 73, but A!s 
promise is nevertheless consideration for B!s. 
Moreover, Bfs promise would be enforceable 
without consideration under Section 82. On 
either basis, B's promise is conditional on 
Afs forbearance and can be enforced only if 
the condition is met. [Emphasis Added] 
Similarly, in L. Simpson Handbook of the Law of Contracts, §56 
at page 94 (2d Ed. 1965), the author states: 
A void bilateral contract, defective 
because one of the promises is insufficient 
consideration for the other, will become a 
valid unilateral contract by performance of 
the defective promise provided the performance 
was legally detrimental to the party who 
rendered it or beneficial to the other party. 
. . . If A, being obligated on a bond to B, 
enters into a special contract to pay the 
amount of the bond to B in installments, if B 
promises to forbear suit on the bond for a 
stated time, though the special promise of A 
furnishes no consideration for Bfs promise 
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since A is only promising to perform an 
already existing duty, yet if B actually 
forbears for the time, A is now bound on his 
special promise. [Emphasis Added] 
See also, Marshall v. Duncan, 322 P.2d 762, 766 (Kan. 1958). 
The cases cited by Kramer in his Brief [pp. 12-13], 
including the case of Estate of Giguere, 366 N.W.2d 345 
(Minn.App. 1985) which is directly on point, demonstrate that 
the extensions granted by Kramer at Friedman's request 
operated to extend the statute of limitations. Consequently, 
the 1981 Loan was clearly not barred by the statute of 
limitations when the 1987 Note was executed and there was 
therefore valid consideration for the 1987 Note. At the very 
least, there is a material issue of fact with respect to the 
extensions which must be resolved at trial. 
2. Kramer's Agreement to Extend Time and Forbear From 
Bringing Suit Constituted Sufficient Consideration For the 
1987 Note. 
Friedman's contention that the fact that Kramer 
extended the repayment date of the obligation and agreed to 
forbear from bringing suit at the time the 1987 Note was 
executed was not consideration because the 1981 Loan was 
already barred by the statute of limitations is wrong for 
another reason. As demonstrated in the court below [R. 69] 
and in Kramer's Brief [p. 16] even if it is assumed the 1981 
Loan was barred, Kramer's agreement constituted sufficient 
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consideration so long as he believed in good faith he had a 
valid claim. Thus, in L. Simpson Handbook of the Law of 
Contracts, §57 at pages 95-97 (2d Ed. 1965), the author states 
the general rule as follows: 
Forbearance or a promise to forbear the 
exercise of a right, a privilege, or a power, 
is sufficient consideration for a promise. A 
request for forbearance where no time is 
stated is presumed to be for a reasonable 
time. Surrender or forbearance to sue a claim 
which is voidable by the exercise of a 
privilege given by law, involves the 
possibility of detriment and constitutes 
sufficient consideration for a counter-
promise. 
. . . But even if invalid, in law or in fact, 
if the claimant reasonably and in good faith 
believes his claim to be valid, forbearance of 
the legal right to have his claim adjudicated 
constitutes detriment and consideration. . . . 
. . . Surrender of a claim which is wholly 
void in law or in fact cannot constitute the 
giving of anything of value; and, if this is 
or should be apparent to the claimant, even if 
bargained for it cannot constitute sufficient 
consideration for a counter-promise. However, 
surrender of a claim which is voidable under 
the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of 
Limitations involves the possibility of value 
given or detriment suffered, and no more is 
needed to furnish consideration for a 
compromise. 
Forbearance to sue on a claim requires no 
different result than surrender. One who has 
a claim of such nature that he has a legal 
right to bring suit upon it, yet forgoes suit, 
has clearly suffered a detriment and this is 
true as well of a doubtful claim, since only 
after adjudication can it be determined that 
it lacks validity. [Emphasis Added] 
This general rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Bank of Commerce v. Seely, 462 P.2d 154 
(Utah 1969), in which the court observed: 
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An extension of time to pay or a promise 
not to sue for a specified time is a 
consideration which will support a promise to 
pay where the promisee in good faith believes 
he has a good cause of action. [462 P.2d at 
155] 
To the same effect, see, Easton v. Ash, 116 P.2d 433, 435-436 
(Cal. 1941) . 
In the present case, at the time Friedman signed the 
1987 Note, Kramer agreed to give him an extension of time to 
pay the indebtedness until December 31, 1987, and to forbear 
suit until that time. The evidence before the court 
demonstrates conclusively that Kramer believed in good faith 
he had a valid claim against Friedman and Friedman has not 
even attempted to argue to the contrary. Accordingly, under 
the foregoing authorities, there was in fact consideration for 
Friedman's execution of the 1987 Note. At the very least, 
there are material issues of fact in this regard. 
3. Friedman is Estopped From Asserting the Statute of 
Limitations. 
Friedman argues that Kramer cannot assert that 
Friedman is estopped from relying on the statute of 
limitations for the first time on appeal and that in any event 
there is no basis for an estoppel. Once again, Friedman's 
argument is not well taken. 
First, Kramer asserted in the court below that he had 
repeatedly extended the time for repayment of the 1981 Loan at 
8 
Friedmap'c r e q u e s : - ' * > 
."a.* ."' :" i*".t'T:.e;ine^s <•*;•': r:. ** /•: j.Tier a g i e o n ; .' * take. . O,J^ . . 
: - F -'~^~
 t ' ** r r - p f r a r ' s ccndi- ." t i n : i . 
-.-xe- - *t i», ni^r : * ' "i 
. * -. - : - * i! r'r i r e ! a i d ,* J.— " e s t o p p e l " 
;i >-
 T v - - < r ^ r K , - i v . a , - -i - s e r t p c i t h a t t h e s e fa<.*ts 
p r e c i ude-« . , ^ ._, L _J : -^  * • 
t.h J .- IO* . M'amer ha - ;.->: - a i s e a a u n t •- naii i s s u e s i n 
i\ -f • : : T ' - » ^ ~ -
 l t o r ^ ^ i r e f a c t s e s t o p 
Friedman from r e l y i n g on tin." s t a t u t e ol 1 i n u t r i t i o n i t e d 
a d d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n s u p p o r t of t h i s p o s i t i o n . A new 
i s s u e I,- f iT^LitPi] . n e r e l y by t h e u s e of d i f f e r e n t 
t*.-r; L.A i , |^i t_ . i i . e s e n i ; inq add i I. i^n . i l 
a t n : r / -> <*n ippeai, ^ r, jar,*,, t v^. i^sue is nut 
p •.. - s 'duse , " of. have been 
presenter * t, • - ;. .^.i ' . s a sai, r _• - ory a m . 
i--• i r^c^} ' *~-u <-.* r» : .^  i i . * < . i Young v. Saroukos, 189 
I -. ^ „i ^  \_a. ^  _cf " r. P;*-- J 
( C , L . e ' Meuse-Rnine-Tjssel Cattle Breeders ci idi.ra-.!. 
Ltd. v. V -Tex .Corp . . r,o < , . . .i 1 * H V ,
 A • 79 ) . 
-- > . - x o x . :_ c a s e t h e a p p l i c a b l e 
{ , ^ , i s ; •*: , • i i . , i r roercuai od^ nn an . . ? i)e t wo en 
t * • r =» - * * - • - ' I (** n ; r oLaht t t \** it r e n t i ui: or 
< i . r r e j e c t e d 
**:- r " . - . - ** * T >,-.. a p p i i c - t i i . . i u : .e U n i t o r m 
9 
Commercial Code on the issue between the parties could, 
therefore, not be raised or considered on appeal, stating: 
It is not considered a new issue to 
consider additional relevant authority in the 
disposition of a case. This does not 
interfere with the course of the litigation 
selected by the parties. There is no reason 
to keep secret the proper law applicable to a 
case just because overlooked. The trial judge 
and the parties had available the UCC to the 
extent applicable. The UCC became a part of 
the contract as though written into its terms. 
[590 P.2d at 1309]1 
Second, Friedman!s argument that there is no evidence 
that any statements or promises were made to induce Kramer 
from forbearing to collect the 1981 Loan is incredible. To 
the contrary, the undisputed evidence was that Friedman 
repeatedly requested his close friend to extend the repayment 
date of the loan and Kramer repeatedly agreed to do so. 
Further, Friedman lulled Kramer into a sense of security by 
repeatedly acknowledging the indebtedness and his intention to 
repay it. Finally, Friedman signed the 1987 Note once again 
agreeing to repay the indebtedness as a result of which Kramer 
took no action to collect the 1981 Loan. Clearly, whether 
1
 Even if this court were to determine that this issue was 
raised for the first time on appeal, the court may nevertheless 
decide the issue. It is not improper to raise a new issue on 
appeal where the underlying facts are not in dispute. See, e.g., 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981); People v. Valleios, supra; 
Burdette v. Rollefson Const. Co., 344 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1959). The 
underlying facts upon which Kramerfs estoppel argument are based 
are undisputed. Second, this court has discretion to hear new 
issues on appeal where justice requires that the issue be heard. 
Earl M. Jorgenson Co. v. Mark Const., Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Ha. 
1975). 
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16. When Friedman agreed to give me the 
Promissory Note, I agreed not to pursue any 
legal action against him and not to make any 
other collection efforts against him if he 
paid the Promissory Note when it became due on 
December 31, 1987. I also agreed to accept 
what I believed was a compromised amount, 
$15,000.00, which was less than the amount of 
the 1981 loan and all the interest that had 
accrued on that loan. [R. 82-83] [Emphasis 
added] 
Second, Friedman asserts that Kramer's position is not 
well taken because "no dispute was compromised in this case11. 
Again, this position totally ignores the evidence cited above 
that the parties compromised the amount owing and Kramer 
agreed to forbear from legal action or further collection 
efforts.2 The whole purpose of the note was to resolve that an 
indebtedness existed from Friedman to Kramer and compromise 
the amount of that indebtedness. Friedman relies heavily on 
Jole v. Bredbenner, 768 P.2d 433 (Or. 1989) in this regard. 
That case is not on point because, unlike the present case, 
there was no evidence the amount owed was ever disputed. 
Friedman also accuses Kramer of trying to 
"manufacture" a dispute in arguing that at the very least 
substantial doubt existed as to whether the debt was barred by 
the statute of limitations. Friedman again miscites Jole as 
rejecting a similar argument on the basis that there was no 
2
 Even if no dispute existed, Kramer's agreement to extend the 
time for repayment and forego suit constituted adequate 
consideration for the 1987 Note under the authorities cited on 
pages 6-7 supra. 
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by Friedman's payment of a portion of the debt. Friedman has 
not and cannot rebut these showings. 
1. Execution of the 1987 Note. 
Friedman seeks to escape the clear import of §78-12-44 
by arguing that the statute requires that the written 
acknowledgement expressly refer to the specific debt being 
revived, contending that this "interpretation of that statute 
follows the reasoning of a long line of Utah cases." [Friedman 
Brief, p. 26] The "long line" of cases to which Friedman 
apparently has reference are three cases (Kuhn v. Mount, 44 P. 
1036 (Utah 1896), Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtliff, 30 P.2d 
733 (Utah 1934) and Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines, Co., 269 
P.2d 867 (Utah 1954)) cited on pages 26 and 27 of Friedman's 
Brief. These cases do not even begin to support the 
hypertechnical view of the statute which Friedman asks this 
court to adopt. Not one of those cases even suggests that the 
acknowledgement must expressly refer to the specific debt 
being revived or that parol evidence may not be utilized to 
determine the issue. Nor does Friedman cite one case from any 
other jurisdiction suggesting such a principle. 
The cases cited by Kramer in his Brief (pp. 20-22) 
plainly set forth the rule that where an acknowledgement or 
promise to pay does not expressly refer to a specific debt, 
parol evidence is admissible to prove the debt to which the 
acknowledgement or promise to pay refers. Friedman does not 
14 
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2. Friedman's Partial Payment. 
Friedman does not deny that in 1987 he made a partial 
payment on his debt in the amount of $1,110.65. Friedman 
contends this partial payment did not revive the obligation 
because Kramer supposedly never sued to recover the 1981 Loan. 
This position is frivolous. Kramer did in fact: seek recovery 
on the 1981 Loan in the alternative to recovery on the 1987 
Note. The First Claim for Relief in the Amended Complaint 
sought recovery on the 1987 Note. Kramer specifically alleged 
in the Second Claim for Relief in the Amended Complaint, in 
the alternative, that he was entitled to recover on the 1981 
Loan because the 1987 Note revived that obligation under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-44. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence below clearly demonstrated and Friedman 
does not even attempt to dispute that he used his friendship 
with Kramer to persuade Kramer to obtain a $5,000.00 loan for 
him and then to extend the repayment date for several years 
with repeated promises that he would repay Kramer. Even after 
this lawsuit was filed Friedman admitted the existence of the 
debt and his intention to repay it. Now through a series of 
extremely technical arguments more suited to 17th Century 
English courts, Friedman asks this court to relieve him of the 
debt. The district court realized how unjust its decision 
16 
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